 |
 |
 |
Leonid
Hurwicz
90-year-old
USA
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN, USA
|
Eric
S. Maskin
57-year-old
USA
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, NJ, USA |
Roger
B. Myerson
56-year-old
USA
University of Chicago
Chicago, IL, USA |
"for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory"
The
design of economic institutions
Adam Smith's classical metaphor of the invisible hand refers to how
the market, under ideal conditions, ensures an efficient allocation
of scarce resources. But in practice conditions are usually not ideal;
for example, competition is not completely free, consumers are not
perfectly informed and privately desirable production and consumption
may generate social costs and benefits. Furthermore, many transactions
do not take place in open markets but within firms, in bargaining
between individuals or interest groups and under a host of other institutional
arrangements. How well do different such institutions, or allocation
mechanisms, perform? What is the optimal mechanism to reach a certain
goal, such as social welfare or private profit? Is government regulation
called for, and if so, how is it best designed?
These questions
are difficult, particularly since information about individual preferences
and available production technologies is usually dispersed among many
actors who may use their private information to further their own
interests. Mechanism design theory, initiated by Leonid Hurwicz and
further developed by Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, has greatly enhanced
our understanding of the properties of optimal allocation mechanisms
in such situations, accounting for individuals' incentives and private
information. The theory allows us to distinguish situations in which
markets work well from those in which they do not. It has helped economists
identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes and voting
procedures. Today, mechanism design theory plays a central role in
many areas of economics and parts of political science.
|
|